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Abstract 
The predominant view in the contemporary philosophies of the life sciences is that the most 
fundamental and viable kinds of explanations are mechanistic. In fact, some philosophers of the 
life science have claimed that the only genuine explanations in the life sciences are mechanistic. 
We believe this to be an unnecessarily restrictive position, both descriptively and normatively. 
Descriptively, much actual scientific research in the life sciences is not readily cast as 
mechanistic. There are many natural phenomena that benefit from the application of multiple 
explanatory strategies, even at the same scale of investigation. Thus, normatively speaking, 
research in the life sciences ought to begin from a pluralistic position concerning explanatory 
style. We defend this claim by means of the application of both mechanistic and dynamical 
explanatory strategies to bird flocking. 
Keywords: bird flocking, dynamical explanation, explanatory pluralism, mechanistic 
explanation 
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Explanatory Pluralism: A Case Study from the Life Sciences 
 
1. Introduction 
For nearly 20 years, a number of philosophers have defended the claim that mechanistic 
explanations are the most fundamental kind of explanations in the life sciences. This claim is 
said to be both historically and normatively true (e.g., Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, 2006; 
Craver, 2005, 2006, 2007; Craver & Bechtel, 2007; Craver & Darden, 2005, 2013; Darden & 
Craver, 2002; Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000; Piccinini & Craver 2011). The reach of 
mechanistic explanations, it is claimed, not only applies to the biological sciences but also other 
special sciences such as economics (Craver & Alexandrova 2008; cf. Reiss, 2007). In keeping 
with this claim are arguments that alternative kinds of explanations, such as dynamical 
explanations, are worthwhile only insofar as they can augment mechanistic explanations (Bechtel 
& Abrahamsen, 2010, 2011; Kaplan & Bechtel, 2011; Kaplan & Craver, 2011). Many responses 
have been made in defense of dynamical explanations as being full explanations in themselves 
(e.g., Beer, 2000; Chemero, 2009; Favela, 2020a; Favela & Martin, 2017; Ross, 2015; van 
Gelder, 1998; Yoshimi, 2012). However, we think there is an issue in the debate that has not 
received enough attention, namely, the restrictive nature of adhering to “one size fits all” 
explanatory frameworks. In short, we think adhering to the mechanism-only position results in 
unnecessarily limited conceptions of the world. Whether implicitly or explicitly, to adhere to a 
position that mechanistic explanations are fundamental is to simultaneously adhere to the idea 
that science investigates a world populated mechanisms (Mitchell, 2002; Wright & Bechtel, 
2006, pp. 59-61). The same goes for dynamical-only explanations. We believe this to be an 
unnecessarily restrictive position, both descriptively and normatively. Descriptively, much actual 
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scientific research in the life sciences is not readily cast as mechanistic (e.g., see Chialvo’s 
discussion of non-mechanistic approaches topics such as biological organisms, glassy states, 
language, proteins, and turbulence; 2018). There are many natural phenomena that benefit from 
the application of multiple explanatory strategies, even at the same scale of investigation. Thus, 
normatively speaking, research in the life sciences ought to begin from a pluralistic position 
concerning explanatory style (e.g., Suppes, 1978). 
The world is tremendously complex. Moreover, there are various explanatory goals that 
guide and motivate investigations. In light of these facts, we believe that investigations in the life 
and other special sciences ought to begin from an agnostic position concerning the nature of the 
phenomena under inquiry (Chemero & Silberstein, 2008; Dale, 2008; Dale, Dietrich, & 
Chemero, 2009; Godfrey-Smith, 2010; Love, 2012; Sterelny, 1996). To start from an agnostic 
position is to be open to pluralism. If we are to be pluralistic, then we should not exclude a priori 
the prospect of multiple empirically reasonable theoretical frameworks. Of course, all 
investigations must start somewhere. However, investigations need not all start from the same 
place, nor do all investigations need to start with the same theoretical commitments. Moreover, 
in some cases there is no single kind of explanation that will account for all aspects of a single 
phenomenon. In other words, there are cases in which no single path to discovery will be able to 
account for the True total nature of a phenomenon. Along these lines, the central argument we 
defend here is as follows: 
P1. Mechanistic explanations appropriately account for some natural phenomena. 
P2. Mechanistic explanations are not always reducible to other kinds of explanations. 
P3. Dynamical explanations appropriately account for some natural phenomena. 
P4. Dynamical explanations are not always reducible to other kinds of explanations. 
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P5. There are natural phenomena with different features amenable to varying explanatory 
strategies. 
P6. The explanatory strategy appropriate for those different features are not reducible to 
other explanatory strategies. 
C1. There are natural phenomena that require multiple explanatory strategies. 
C2. There are natural phenomena that require both mechanistic and dynamical 
explanations. 
Conclusions one and two underlie the necessity for explanatory pluralism in the life 
sciences. We demonstrate this and explanatory pluralism by means of a case study. The case 
study is that of bird flocking, specifically, starling murmurations. We proceed by first giving an 
account of mechanistic and dynamical explanations. Then, we present our case study: bird 
flocking. After, we describe mechanistic and dynamical explanations of different aspects of bird 
flocking at the same scale of investigation. We then address the challenge from proponents of 
dynamic mechanistic explanations. Finally, we elucidate why this case supports the notion of 
explanatory pluralism. In particular, we make clear how a devotion to explanatory monism 
prevents one from being able to account for certain features of a natural, biological phenomenon. 
Being an explanatory pluralist allows one to account for those features. 
 
2. Mechanistic and Dynamical Explanations 
What follows are accounts of mechanistic and dynamical explanations. Given the 
enormous size of the relevant literature, we do not claim to provide all encompassing accounts of 
mechanistic or dynamical explanations. Instead, we intend to highlight some of the typical 
characteristics of those explanations, particularly those that we understand as being difficult to 
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reconcile and which we take as underlying reasons why the two approaches are often viewed as 
at odds with each other. Moreover, we focus on those aspects of these two explanatory strategies 
that are explicitly utilized in scientific practice. 
 
2.1 Mechanistic explanations 
There are numerous versions of “mechanistic explanations” (for a very small sample see 
Bechtel, 2008; Bechtel & Richardson, 1993/2010; Craver, 2007; Glennan, 2005; Machamer, 
Darden, & Craver, 2000; etc.). Though there are a number of sophisticated philosophical 
accounts of mechanistic explanation in recent years (for review see Glennan & Illari, 2018), here 
we limit ourselves to early work that can broadly be conceived as the “new mechanism” that 
appeared in the 1990s and early 2000s (i.e., Bechtel & Richardson, 1993/2010; Machamer et al., 
2000). We limit our discussion to that conception of mechanistic explanation for two reasons. 
First, attempting to synthesize the literature into a single “mechanistic framework,” while 
properly treating the relevant work, is far beyond the scope of the current work. Second, we take 
the early work by people such as Bechtel and Richardson to be attempts at understanding 
heuristics utilized by scientists in their research (1993/2010, e.g., pp. xiii-xiv, xix, 37, 236); 
heuristics that we take to still be central to practice in the life sciences. Accordingly, we utilize 
“mechanistic explanation” as referring to three main features: linearity, localization, and 
component dominance. Before explaining each of those features, we begin with a general 
description of a mechanistic explanatory strategy. In very broad terms, a mechanistic explanation 
is one in which the behavior of a system is accounted for in terms of the functions and 
interactions of its parts (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993/2010, p. 17). “Mechanisms” are the entities 
and activities whose organization exhibits the explained phenomenon (Craver, 2007). The 
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organization of these entities and activities produce regular changes from start or set-up to finish 
or termination conditions (Craver & Darden, 2013, p. 15; Machamer et al., 2000). 
The methods utilized to bring about these explanations are those of decomposition and 
localization. As Bechtel and Richardson describe it, decomposition allows for “the activity of a 
whole system [to be treated] as the product of a set of subordinate functions (1993/2010, p. 23). 
Moreover, these interactions are accounted for in a manner that is additive and linear 
(1993/2010, p. 23). Localization is the investigative process by which “the different activities 
proposed in a task decomposition [are identified] with the behavior or capacities of specific 
components” (1993/2010, p. 26). A mechanistic explanation is achieved when a phenomenon’s 
mechanisms are described (Machamer et al., 2000). With this general picture of mechanistic 
frameworks and explanations in mind, we now focus on three of the main commitments of 
mechanistic explanations: linearity, localization, and component dominance. 
The first commitment underlying mechanistic frameworks is linearity. Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver state that, “Mechanisms are entities and activities such that they are 
productive of regular change from start or setup to finish or termination conditions” (2000, p. 3). 
Such a conception of mechanisms should not be surprising since one of the heuristic assumptions 
of human bounded rationality is that humans often think of events as occurring linearly (Bechtel 
& Richardson, 1993/2010, p. 18). In other words, humans think about events in sequential and 
step-by-step terms: “Why did D happen? Because first A, then B and C, and then D.” In order to 
reveal the significance such commitments to linearity have, it is informative to look at how 
linearity constrains the way data is analyzed. 
Linearity can be understood as a temporal factor in that phenomena are the result of 
sequential steps. As long as the steps in a particular linear process are followed, then particular 
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outcomes are guaranteed. When conceived of as a temporal factor, linearity can be understood 
structurally, where “structure” refers to the relations of parts. In that way linearity can be 
understood as a kind of additivity (Sternberg, 1969), and can be summed up in the following 
equation (Eq. 1; Ivancevic & Ivancevic, 2007, p. 52): 
 f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y) (1) 
The idea that the equation captures is that a phenomenon, f, can be characterized as composed of 
components x and y, or f can be characterized as components x and y added together. The 
phenomenon f is nothing more or less if it is conceptualized as being a unit comprised of parts x 
and y or as a phenomenon comprised of part x added to part y. 
If a phenomenon is linear, and if it is additive, then it should follow that the effects of 
perturbations on the system are localized in individual components (Holden, Van Orden, & 
Turvey, 2009, p. 319). Systems that are the result of additive dynamics can be described as 
having weak interactions (Holden et al., 2009). They are “weak” because system-level behaviors 
are primarily the result of their parts added together. Consider a system S comprised of parts X, 
Y, and Z. If the properties of S are the result of additive relations among X, Y, Z, and if X = 1, Y = 
2, and Z = 3, then S will have property 6 (SX,Y,Z), specifically, the result of an additive 
relationship among X, Y, and Z (1 + 2 + 3 = 6). Thus, if X were perturbed such that property 1 
was “knocked out” (e.g., when a neuron receives a “block” and is cutoff from inputs from other 
neurons), then S should have a resulting property 5 (Sy,z). System S goes from property 6 to 
property 5 because perturbing X alone does not affect the properties of Y or Z. Such a system can 
be understood as being component dominant. 
Component dominance refers to cases where a system’s behaviors result from additively 
and linearly organized parts with rigid architecture and predetermined functions. A component-
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dominant system is one that can be decomposed into distinct functional units of a larger system 
(Richardson & Chemero, 2014). Where the relevant components “bottom out” is a matter of 
debate (e.g., Kuhlmann & Glennan, 2014). Though for current purposes, we can understand the 
“lowest level” components as those that are experimentally revealed to be the spatial (e.g., size), 
temporal (e.g., duration), and causal (e.g., feedback) parts of the mechanism under investigation 
(Povich & Craver, 2018, p. 106). One way to identify components is to first assume the 
phenomenon under investigation is additive. In order to reveal additivity, the phenomenon is 
decomposed in order to localize specific capacities. When the data from the parts are analyzed, 
they should demonstrate component-dominant dynamics, that is, weakly interacting parts, with 
local affects that can be summed to reveal the whole behavior. If the parts of the system can be 
summed to reveal the whole behavior, then the commitments to linearity, additivity, localization, 
and component dominance was the correct one. Both artifacts and natural phenomena can exhibit 
additivity, linearity, and component dominance. Artifacts include combustion engines, pocket 
calculators, and toilets. Natural phenomena include Shepherds’ account of chemical transmission 
at synapses (Machamer et al., 2000, pp. 8-13), long-term potentiation (Craver, 2005), vitamin C 
biosynthesis (Figure 1A), and major signal transduction pathways (Figure 1B). Again, as we 
stated at the start of this section, our aim was not to synthesize the large and sophisticated 
philosophical literature on mechanisms. Instead, we merely aimed to present a form of 
mechanistic explanation that we take to be common in scientific practice. In the following 
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Figure 1 
Common Biological Mechanisms 
 
Note. Schematics of biological mechanisms can be as relatively straightforward as the 
mechanism for vitamin C biosynthesis in vertebrates (A); or as complicated as major signal 
transduction pathways in mammals (B). (Copyright Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0 and CC BY-SA 
4.0.) 
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2.2 Dynamical explanations 
The philosophical literature on dynamical explanations is not nearly as vast or 
controversial as that for mechanisms; this is especially true for special sciences (for discussion, 
see Favela, 2020b). This may be due to philosophers inheriting a clearer articulation of the 
concepts and methods from engineers and scientists who broadly agree on their definition and 
usage (for review see Strogatz, 2018). Dynamical explanatory strategies typically center on 
accounting for the relevant variables within a set of differential equations and depicting the 
phenomenon in a phase space, which, following the variables in the equations, represents all 
possible states of the system and how the system evolves over time. Although there are linear 
dynamical systems, much of the appeal and power of dynamical systems theory stems from its 
ability to capture nonlinear phenomena. Dynamical explanations tend to focus on the principles 
responsible for a system’s spatial and temporal structure. Such explanations are similar, though 
not equivalent, to covering law explanations, are counter-factual supporting, and provide 
evidence for unification of apparently distinct phenomena (Stepp, Chemero, & Turvey, 2011, pp. 
432-435). 
When thinking about the nature of dynamical explanations, the first thing to keep in mind 
is that dynamical explanations seek to accomplish something very different than mechanistic 
explanations. As discussed in the previous section, mechanistic explanations tend to focus on 
identifying the constitutive components and properties of the components of the phenomenon. 
Dynamicists tend to be interested in discovering principles, how widely they apply in nature, and 
how they can be predicted and manipulated in order to facilitate understanding of complex 
phenomena. Instead of the constituents of a phenomenon, dynamical explanations are about 
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discovering how the states of a system evolve over time according to a principle (Riley & 
Holden, 2012). These principles are often written captured via differential equations, which are 
suited due to their ability to express temporal features of a system. Nonetheless, for an 
investigator to understand how the system evolves, having access to a model and solving the 
equations is not always enough. That is why it is typical for an investigator to plot the equation 
in a state space, which contains all possible states of the system over time (Kelso, 1997). Having 
a qualitative interpretation of a system (i.e., a state space, phase space portrait, etc.) facilitates 
understanding for an investigator in a way that equations alone do not. 
As mentioned above, the dynamical systems treatment of a phenomenon includes 
capturing the phenomenon in a phase space that represents all possible states of the system and 
how the system evolves over time. Such pictorial depictions of a system can facilitate 
understanding a system in a way that abstract equations might not. Take the example of the 
bursting behavior of a single neuron (Izhikevich, 2007). Izhikevich’s “simple” model of spiking 
neurons is represented via the following two coupled differential equations (Izhikevich, 2010, p. 
5063, equations 2.1 and 2.2): 
 𝐶?̇? = 𝑘(𝑣 −	𝑣!"#$)(𝑣 − 𝑣$%!"#%) − 	𝑢 + 	𝐼 (2.1) 
and 
 ?̇? = 𝑎[𝑏(𝑣 − 𝑣!"#$) − 𝑢] (2.2) 
With these two equations, the entire range of firing behavior of a pyramidal neuron is captured. 
The equation in the first part of the model (2.1) captures factors responsible for a single neuron’s 
membrane potential (v), or firing. The second equation (2.2) captures factors responsible for the 
recovery, or repolarization, of a single neuron (u). 
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Although this simple model is biologically realistic, Izhikevich points out that solving 
(i.e., understanding) the model of the firing behavior of the neuron is difficult to achieve 
analytically (2007, pp. 43, 81, 270). In this situation, “analytic” means obtaining knowledge 
about the behavior of the system by actually solving the equations. Solving differential equations 
is fundamental to the utilization of such methods. In order to solve a differential equation, one 
must find a function that specifies a rule that determines values of the dependent variable and 
does not change the dependent variables (Brown, 2007, p. 13). Thus, in order to solve or 
understand the model, it is necessary to plot it in a phase space (Figure 2). This phase space 
portrait allows the qualitative behavior of a complex system (single neurons) to be analyzed via a 
model with two differential equations (2.1 and 2.2), all in terms of a simple two-dimensional 
plane that shows the entire range of behaviors of the system over time. Understanding is 
facilitated by limiting the causally relevant factors to two dimensions: recovery variable u and 
membrane potential v. This strategy is particularly well-suited for investigating phenomena with 
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Figure 2 
Phase Space Portrait of Izhikevich Model of Spiking Neurons 
 
Note. Phase space portrait of Izhikevich model of spiking neurons (2010, p. 5063; equations 2.1 
and 2.2). As part of the dynamical explanatory strategy, plotting equations on a two-dimensional 
plane can provide a qualitative understanding of a model otherwise too complicated to solve 
analytically. (Modified with permission from J. Terwilliger, 2018. Retrieved October 24, 2018 
from http://jackterwilliger.com/biological-neural-networks-part-i-spiking-neurons/) 
 
Nonlinearity refers to the dynamics of systems whereby the output is not directly 
proportional to the input (Carello & Moreno, 2005). This is in contrast to linear systems that are 
additive in that outputs are directly proportional to inputs. As discussed in the previous section, if 
a phenomenon is linear, and if it is additive, then it should follow that the effects of perturbations 
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on the system will reveal “weak interactions” localized in individual components (Holden, Van 
Orden, & Turvey, 2009, p. 319). Systems that are nonlinear, on the other hand, are not typically 
comprised of weakly interacting components. Thus, instead of being component dominant, 
nonlinear systems can be interaction dominant. 
Interaction dominance refers to a kind of dynamics exhibited by a system. Systems are 
interaction dominant when the dynamics or properties of the interactions among the parts 
supersede those that the parts would have separately or if the parts contributed to a system via 
additive interactions (Holden et al., 2009; Silberstein & Chemero, 2013; Silberstein, 2021). 
Interaction-dominant systems can also be described as non-modular or non-decomposable. When 
a system is modular, decomposable, and component dominant, then the properties of the system 
result from the properties of the component parts “added” together. In this way, the composition 
and capacities of parts can be the primary cause of the dynamics of the system. Mechanistic 
explanation is appropriate in these cases because when a system is component dominant, then the 
strategy of decomposition and localization works quite well. However, in the case of systems 
with interaction-dominant dynamics, the method of decomposition and localization is not usually 
effective, as the properties of interaction-dominant systems result primarily from the dynamic 
interactions of the components. It is possible to figure out how the properties of the components 
contribute to the dynamics of the system, but only when examined post-hoc. In other words, if an 
investigator were presented with a set of components, and if she were not permitted to observe 
how those components act as a system, then it is unlikely—if not impossible—to predict what 
the system’s behavior would be. In some cases, this is due to the fact that components of 
interaction-dominant systems can have properties that result from non-additive interactions 
(Carello & Moreno, 2005; Sternberg, 1969, 2011). 
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In the previous section, we described a linear and additive system, S. Let us look at a 
nonlinear and non-additive system, S*. If S* is comprised of A, B, C, where A =1, B = 2, and C = 
3, but the interactions among A, B, C are nonlinear, then swapping out A for D (D = 4) could 
alter the interactions of the entire system. So, if S* is a nonlinear and non-additive system, then 
the system-level activity could be exponential or multiplicative, for example: S* = 24 (where 
S*D,B,C [4 × 2 × 3 = 24]) or S* = 96 (where S*D,B,C [42 × 2 × 3 = 96]). In this way, we can also see 
what happens to a system that is interaction dominant. 
Interaction-dominant systems have system-level properties that override the properties of 
the components. In a component-dominant system, where the interactions of the components are 
additive, the properties of the whole system are no more or less than the properties of the 
components: System SX,Y,Z (X =1, Y = 2, and Z = 3) has property 6 if the interactions are additive 
(1 + 2 + 3 = 6). In an interaction-dominant system where the interactions are nonlinear (i.e., 
exponential or multiplicative), the interactions of the components are altered based on the nature 
of the system as a whole: System S*D,B,C (D = 4, B = 2, and C = 3) has property 39 if the 
interactions are additive ([4 + 2]2 + 3 = 39) or property 192 if the interactions are multiplicative 
([4 × 2]2 × 3 = 192). In the previous two examples, the brackets and exponent are intended to 
capture the nonlinear effects upon an interaction-dominant system, that is, how the place within a 
system can alter the properties within that system. 
This concludes our descriptions of mechanistic and dynamical explanations. As we 
mentioned at the start of this section, given the enormous size of the relevant literature, we have 
not intended to provide comprehensive accounts of mechanistic or dynamical explanations. 
Instead, we focused on the characteristics that most clearly differentiate them, specifically, the 
emphasis on linearity and component dominance typical to mechanistic explanations, and the 
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emphasis on nonlinearity and interaction dominance of dynamical explanations. Moreover, we 
focused on conceptual and methodological commitments that we take scientific practitioners to 
adhere to when their work expresses commitments to mechanistic or dynamical features. With 
these accounts given, we can proceed to our case study in explanatory pluralism. 
 
3. A Case Study 
Starlings (sturnus vulgaris) are a family of small to medium-sized birds found in many 
places around the world including Asia, Europe, and North America. Among other things, 
starlings are known for their murmurations. A “murmuration” is a flock of starlings. Starling 
flocks can number in the hundreds to thousands. What makes these flocks noteworthy is their 
globally unified behavior. Murmurations are a coordination phenomenon in which interactions 
between individuals produce collective, large-scale patterns (Bialek et al. 2012, p. 4787). To 
watch a flock of starlings during the day is to see a single, dark, and large blob-like form moving 
about and taking on various shapes in the sky (Figure 3). No matter the directions or shapes, the 
flock maintains movements that appear collective, synchronous, and ordered in a global manner 
(Cavagna et al. 2010, p. 11865). Explaining such collective animal behavior is very difficult, 
particularly if you want to explain how each bird has the nearest neighbors that it has at a 
particular time. This problem is further confounded if you want your explanation to be done with 
a few simple rules and variables. There are two explanations that have come to the forefront in 
the literature on bird flocking (Bialek et al. 2012; Cavagna et al. 2010; Cavagna et al. 2013a; 
Cavagna et al. 2013b; Kattas et al. 2012; Procaccini et al. 2011). One explanation is mechanistic 
and accounts for scale-free behavior and bird orientation. The other explanation is dynamical and 
accounts for scale-free behavior and bird velocity. Each will be presented in turn. It is crucial to 
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keep in mind that both are applied at the same level of analysis, that is, the biobehavioral scale at 





Note. Starling flock in Gretna, Dumfries and Galloway, Scotland. (Source: Walter Baxter. 
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic License. Retrieved September 25, 2013 
from http://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/1069366). 
 
3.1 Mechanistic explanation of orientation in bird flocking 
When attempting to account for bird flocking behavior, the mechanistic explanation 
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attempts to answer the following question: How does the behavior of bird X navigating amongst 
its nearest neighbors, Y1-Y7, result in scale-free correlations? “Scale-free” refers to the behavior 
of the flock as a whole such that the “behavioral change of one individual influences and is 
influenced by the behavioral changes of all other individuals in the group” (Cavagna et al. 2010, 
p. 11866). One aspect of this question involves providing an explanation for the orientation of 
each bird. The mechanistic explanation for this feature of the phenomenon posits the maximum 
entropy model (Bialek et al. 2012). This model accounts for the location of nearest neighbors by 
starting from the individual bird and explaining outwards towards the flock. The model also 
attempts to account for the effect of one bird’s movements as cascading throughout the flock. As 
a result, the flock is understood primarily as a group of individual birds. 
In utilizing the maximum entropy model, the mechanist need only posit “[s]imple 
behavioral rules based on imitation” to account for coordination among nearest neighbors 
(Cavagna et al. 2010, p. 11869). The behavior based on imitation that the maximum entropy 
model ascribes to individual members of flocks are treated as tantamount to the behavior of 
ferromagnetism. Ferromagnetism is the kind of magnetic force that most people are familiar 
with. Demonstrations of ferromagnetism include, for example, the forces responsible for magnets 
sticking to refrigerator doors and two magnets repelling from one another when both of their 
positive charged sides are facing each other (Newman, 2008; Sandeman et al. 2008). Similarly, 
individual birds are treated as individual magnets: birds have a front and back end, and magnets 
have a positive and negative end. 
If individual birds are accurately treated as individual magnets, then a model of the 
individual birds based on such magnetic properties should be consistent with actual flock 
movements (i.e., maximum entropy distribution; Bialek et al. 2012, p. 4786). Bialek et al. (2012) 
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where 𝑗 ∈ 𝑛'-  refers to individual bird 𝑗 belonging to group 𝑛' with nearest neighbors 𝑖. As 
Bialek et al. (2012) demonstrate, the model provides simulations that are indeed consistent with 
experimental correlations in large flocks of starlings. From this core model, further models 
following the same rules of ferromagnetism, which underlie maximum entropy distribution, can 
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(5) 
where 𝑛' refers to orientations of neighborhood of birds. A powerful feature of the basic model 
in Eq. 4 is that in addition to providing the orientation of individual birds in a flock, it also 
exhibits the scale-free structure of the flock as a whole. Thus, modifications to the model, such 
as Eq. 5, allow for the comparison of flocks of various sizes without compromising the 
experimentally consistent scale-free behavior among flock orientations (Bialek et al. 2012). 
Whether tracking individual birds (e.g., 𝑗 in Eq. 4) or two or more birds (e.g., 𝑛' in Eq. 5), it is 
the influence of the individual upon the group that is captured via the models. Since the models 
are consistent with experimental data (i.e., movements of real bird flocks), it is reasonable to 
understand that individual bird orientation is driven via a local (i.e., individual bird) process. 
Moreover, such local processes also contribute to the scale-free structure of the flock as a whole. 
By modeling the flocks as being composed of birds with magnet-like rules of behavior, 
the maximum entropy model accounts for the location of each nearest neighbor, with the added 
benefit of also capturing the flock’s apparent scale-free coordination. The explanation is 
EXPLANATORY PLURALISM 21 
mechanistic because the basic tenets of a mechanistic explanation remain, namely, that of linear 
decomposition and localization: the coordination behavior of the whole flock can be treated as 
the product of decomposable linear activities that are localizable in the individual birds. Once 
decomposed and localized, the coordination of the individual birds in the flock can be modeled 
in a manner similar to the ferromagnetic forces. 
 
3.2 Dynamical explanation of velocity in bird flocking 
As with the mechanistic explanation, when attempting to account for bird flocking 
behavior, the dynamical explanation attempts to answer the following question: How does the 
behavior of bird X navigating amongst its nearest neighbors, Y1-Y7, result in scale-free 
correlations? As stated above, “scale-free” refers to the behavioral change of individuals 
influencing the flock as a whole. One aspect of this question involves providing an explanation 
for the velocity of each bird. The dynamical explanation for this feature of the phenomenon 
posits the superdiffusion model (Cavagna et al. 2013a). This model accounts for the velocity of 
each bird by starting from the flock as a whole and explaining inwards towards the individual. In 
other words, this approach treats the flock as the primary system to be explained, whereas the 
mechanistic model above treated the individual birds as requiring the primary explanation. The 
superdiffusion model also accounts for the effect of the velocity of the flock as a whole 
cascading throughout to affect the velocity of each individual bird. 
The dynamical explanation accounts for the velocity of a bird and its nearest neighbors in 
terms of their behavior resulting from diffusion taking its course: at each instant of time each 
bird is interacting with whatever birds have been brought there by their superdiffusive wandering 
throughout the flock (Cavagna et al. 2013a, p. 5). In physics, diffusion is the process by which 
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particles seem to spread randomly, often to the point of equilibrium if environmental conditions 
suffice (Newman, 2008, pp. 15-16, 33-36). When superdiffusion occurs in scale-free systems, 
particles (or birds) will explore space via nonlinear processes (ben-Avraham & Havlin, 2004, pp. 
57-72; Li et al. 2011). 
If bird flocks do indeed move via superdiffusion, then the model should demonstrate 
individual bird movements that are consistent with actual flock movements. Cavagna et al. 
(2013) provide the following model (Eq. 6) to capture the diffusion processes of the flock, 
 𝛿𝑅2(𝑡) = 𝐷𝑡3 (6) 
where 𝛿 is the change of the position of birds 𝑅 at time 𝑡, 𝑎 is the diffusion exponent, and 𝐷 is 
the diffusion coefficient. Simulations of the model are consistent with experimental observations 















where 𝑹89(𝑡) refers to the position of the center of the flock at time 𝑡 and 𝑟-(𝑡) = 𝑅-(𝑡) −
𝑅89(𝑡) refers to the position of a bird 𝑖 in the flock. Along with the number of birds in the flock 
𝑁 and the time series length 𝑇, the velocity of the flock can be calculated. A powerful feature of 
Eq. 4 is that in addition to providing the velocity of the flock, it also maintains the scale-free 
structure of the flock as whole. This is accounted for by treating the individual birds as relating 
to the whole flock as if they are individual particles within a body of fluid. Moreover, the 
relationship of bird to flock and vice versa—as particle to fluid and vice versa—is nonlinear. 
Specifically, the velocity affects the flock via cascades that are not additive (i.e., linear), but 
multiplicative (i.e., nonlinear). Such a nonlinear relationship contributes to explanations of 
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velocity resisting the methods of decomposition and localization, namely, methods more 
appropriate to phenomena comprised of additively/linearly related components. By modeling the 
flock as a single superdiffusive system, the superdiffusion model accounts not only for the 
velocity of each bird, but also for the scale-free coordination of the flock. Moreover, accurate 
predictions can be made of the velocities of the birds within the flock, thereby negating the need 
to decompose the flock and localize individual birds (Cavagna et al. 2013a, pp. 7-8). 
 
4. Dynamic Mechanistic Explanations 
As stated in the introduction, the predominant view in the philosophies of the life 
sciences is that it is both historically and normatively true that mechanistic explanations are the 
most fundamental kind of explanations in the life sciences. There is a lot to be said for that 
position, not least of which is the descriptive fact that the term ‘mechanism’ is commonly used in 
the life sciences. There are countless examples of this in neuroscience alone, where questions are 
typically stated in the form of, “What are the mechanisms of: Alzheimer’s, memory, pleasure 
and displeasure, stress, theta rhythms, vision, etc.?” With that said, proponents of mechanistic 
explanations in the life sciences have been challenged by phenomena that resist typical 
mechanistic methodologies (i.e., decomposition and localization) and conceptualizations (e.g., 
linearity and component dominance). The challenges come from phenomena that are nonlinear 
and interaction dominant in nature. So, what happens when a proponent of mechanism-only 
explanations is faced with a phenomenon that lends itself to nonlinear dynamical, graph-
theoretic, or topological concepts and methods? Such folks tend to break into two camps: One 
camp argues that those concepts and methods are not parts of explanations insofar as they are not 
mechanistic explanations (e.g., Craver, 2007; Darden & Craver, 2002; Kaplan & Bechtel, 2011; 
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Piccinini & Craver, 2011). The other camp says that those concepts and methods are parts of 
explanations insofar as they are part of dynamic mechanistic explanations (DME; e.g., Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2010, 2011, 2013; Kaplan, 2018; Levy & Bechtel, 2013). 
Proponents of DME typically make two moves: import methods from other explanatory 
frameworks and/or redefine ‘mechanism’ to include concepts from other explanatory 
frameworks. Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2013) provide an illustrative example of the “import 
methods” move. Bechtel and Abrahamsen argue that a DME account of circadian rhythms 
involves decomposing the phenomenon into component parts and operations, then recomposing 
the components via computational models that include differential equations corresponding to 
the parts and operations (2013, pp. 707-708). We do not think this approach is actually anything 
more than a mechanistic explanation, albeit one that uses calculus to bolster the conceptual and 
methodological commitments. Merely corresponding differential equations to components does 
not make an explanation “dynamical,” that is, in the sense we described “dynamical 
explanations” above. Thus, utilizing calculus cannot be a differentiating factor among dynamical, 
mechanistic, and DME. Besides, plenty of classical computational explanations and the like use 
calculus (e.g., Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003; Harnad, 1993; Pylyshyn, 1984; see discussion by 
Lamb & Chemero, 2018). Mechanistic explanations adhere to the method of decomposition and 
localization; Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s DME does that. Mechanistic explanations are also 
component dominant; Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s DME is also, albeit with the addition of 
differential equations to correspond with the components. What makes “dynamical explanations” 
interesting is not their use of differential equations. Dynamical explanations are interesting only 
insofar as the phenomena they investigate exhibit properties different than or incommensurable 
with those of other explanatory strategies, such as interaction dominance. 
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The second move made by DME proponents when faced with a phenomenon that resists 
mechanistic methods and/or concepts is to redefine what a “mechanism” is. Proponents of DME 
do not abandon mechanistic frameworks when a phenomenon is, for example, interaction 
dominant. Instead, they expand the purview of mechanistic explanations to include phenomena 
they had not before. We assume that is not a legitimate argumentative tactic. Such a move is 
tantamount to the following line of thought: “I argue that all humans are mortal.” I then meet an 
immortal human. Instead of saying, “I cannot categorize all humans as mortal,” I now say, 
“Some mortal things live forever.” It is, admittedly, common for philosophers to define technical 
terms as they see fit, but doing so runs the risk of failed communication and muddied waters. 
However, as it concerns the mechanistic vs. dynamical explanations debate, we ought to be clear 
about what commitments each explanatory framework makes and, especially, pay attention to the 
features that make differences in their being different. Using differential equations, as mentioned 
above, is not one of those commitments. Understanding a phenomenon as component or 
interaction dominant is. Such commitments are not readily encompassed by the other framework, 
which is why they are different approaches in the first place (for more detailed discussion of this 
issue, we recommend Issad & Malaterre, 2015). 
 
5. Explanatory Pluralism 
In the preceding sections, we presented bird flocking as a case in the life sciences that is 
justifiably given both a mechanistic and dynamical explanation for various features at the same 
biobehavioral scale. The mechanistic strategy treats the flock as a collection of individual units. 
Bird orientation and scale-free coordination are explained via the maximum entropy model, 
which regards individual birds as following simple rules similar to individual magnets. The 
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dynamical strategy treats the flock as a single complex system that emerges from the interaction 
of individual units. Bird velocity and scale-free coordination are explained via the superdiffusion 
model, which regards the flock as a single mass where individual birds are moved by and move 
the system via a diffusive process. Each explanation aims at the same general question: How 
does the behavior of bird X navigating amongst its nearest neighbors, Y1-Y7, result in scale-free 
correlations? However, each strategy provides a different kind of explanation for different 
features of the same phenomenon: bird location and bird velocity. All of the explanations (i.e., 
models) occur at the same scale of investigation, namely, the biobehavioral level at which 
murmurations occur. Is there a single explanatory strategy that will account for all aspects of this 
single scale? Specifically, is there justifiable reason to attempt to provide a mechanist account of 
velocity or a dynamical account of location? We do not believe so. Though there is overlap in 
some of the explained behavior (i.e., scale-free coordination), there are essential features of the 
phenomenon that are excluded by the explanations of each explanatory strategy. Consequently, 
the features of the bird flock at the biobehavioral scale are not all appropriately conceptualized as 
mechanisms (e.g., component dominant) or dynamical systems (e.g., interaction dominant). This 
is because the flock both has mechanisms and is a dynamical system at the same scale of 
investigation. 
It is reasonable to see hints of the predicament of underdetermination in science as an 
underlying issue (Stanford, 2009). Specifically, one could claim there is not yet enough evidence 
to arbitrate the issue. Perhaps a mechanist can say, “My strategy explains bird orientation, it will 
eventually explain bird location too!” Perhaps a dynamicist can say, “My strategy explains bird 
location, it will eventually explain bird orientation too!” Nonetheless, underdetermination is not 
an issue here, nor are issues concerning empirically equivalent theories (van Fraassen, 1980). 
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When placed within different investigative frameworks, bird flocking can be conceptualized in 
different ways. For example, if the bird flock is a component-dominant system, then all of its 
features are additively and linearly related. On the other hand, if the bird flock is an interaction-
dominant system, then all of its features are nonlinearly related. The challenge with applying one 
set of theoretical commitments (e.g., component or interaction dominance) to this case is that 
there is empirical evidence for both being applicable to different features. It seems that there is 
not empirical equivalence among mechanistic and dynamical strategies because each strategy is 
applied to different features, namely, orientation and velocity. If certain theoretical commitments 
are accurate, namely, if certain features of the flock are properly characterized as component 
dominant and others as interaction dominant, then it would be unproductive to attempt to fit the 
square peg of component-dominant phenomena into the round hole of dynamical explanations or 
the round peg of interaction-dominant phenomena into the square hole of mechanistic 
explanations. 
With that said, in light of the possibility of giving two equally viable explanations of 
different aspects of the same phenomenon, we believe that starting investigations from positions 
other than pluralism can result in the unjustifiable application of theoretical commitments. 
Starting from a commitment to pluralism allows one to utilize various explanatory tools without 
the limitations that come with stringent adherence to single strategies. A lesson to take from a 
commitment to pluralism is that the study of a single phenomenon may simultaneously require 
multiple kinds of explanatory frameworks. This is not because the data is underdetermined or 
there is empirical equivalency. This is because the data from a single phenomenon are the result 
of very different kinds of causes, namely, causes that in one instance are best treated 
mechanistically and in another best treated dynamically. Insisting on just one style of explanation 
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will leave us in the position of being able to explain bird orientation or bird velocity, but not 
both. 
Let us revisit the argument presented in the first section. We have shown that (P1) 
mechanistic explanations appropriately account for some natural phenomena, here, bird 
orientation, which is a phenomenon not readily reducible to another explanatory framework (P2), 
such as a dynamical one. We have shown that (P3) dynamical explanations appropriately account 
for some natural phenomena, here, bird velocity, which is a phenomenon not readily reducible to 
another explanatory framework (P4), such as a mechanistic one. Starling murmurations are a 
natural phenomenon that exhibit various features amenable to different kinds of explanatory 
strategies (P5): mechanistic approach for bird orientation and dynamical approach for bird 
velocity. Due to key commitments of each (P6), mechanistic strategies (e.g., component 
dominance) do not reduce to dynamical approaches, and dynamical strategies (e.g., interaction 
dominance) do not reduce to mechanistic approaches. Thus (C1), starling murmurations require 
multiple explanatory strategies to explain various features at the same biobehavioral scale of 
investigation. Moreover (C2), starling murmurations require both mechanistic (i.e., orientation) 
and dynamical (i.e., velocity) explanatory strategies to be more fully understood. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We view explanatory pluralism as a virtue. Starting from a position of pluralism is a 
virtue not only in scientific inquiry but other forms of inquiry as well. It is likely that some see 
explanatory pluralism as a bad position to subscribe to. Examples include those who adhere to 
the mechanism-only or dynamical-only explanatory framework points of view, as well as those 
who think that what makes dynamical explanations interesting can readily be subsumed by 
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mechanistic approaches. Others likely not to be satisfied with explanatory pluralism include 
those who want necessary and sufficient conditions for such concepts as “science,” “cause,” and 
“explanation.” However, those who are interested in the practice of science will see that there is 
no matter of fact as to which kind of explanation holds the position of primacy over all others 
(cf. Feyerabend, 1975/2010). Furthermore, those interested in the practice of science will also 
see that there is no adherence to a single theoretical commitment, come what may (cf. Quine, 
1951). An honest investigator, be she a biologist, philosopher, or physicist, will accept the 
primacy of phenomena over commitment to ideology. Moreover, pluralism is not just the 
beginning, but also sometimes the end. That is to say, that there are different kinds of 
explanations of the same system; or, as we show here, different kinds of explanations—with 
some opposing claims; e.g., component vs. interaction dominance—of the different but closely 
related aspects of the same system. This is not necessarily a case of underdetermination, or a 
failure to find the right mechanistic or dynamical explanation. This can be the end state. In this 
case, the orientations of individual birds in the flock are mechanistically explained, while their 
velocity is dynamically explained. There is no reason to think that starling murmurations are 
unique in this respect. 
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